Hand Grenades under the Negotiating Table

By Kivanc Ozcan
International Affairs Review, October 18, 2010


The U.S. media is actively covering the latest attempts at an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. But despite this exuberance in the U.S., a closer look at the situation in the Middle East suggests that negotiations may have commenced prematurely and actually endangered the peace process.

Now may not be the right time to hold these talks. Only 32 percent of Palestinians support starting direct negotiations with Israel, according to the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion. There is also strong opposition in Israel, where Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has publicly expressed his discontent with the talks – in direct opposition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Coming to the negotiating table when major obstacles still exist on both sides may blow up the peace process altogether. Since direct talks trigger such strong objections, the parties should address their internal divisions first. They can continue talking later. The negotiating table is always there.

So far, both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Netanyahu have been sitting at the negotiating table holding political hand-grenades that make the solution almost impossible. The Palestinian president threatened to leave the talks if settlement construction restarts in the West Bank. In return, Netanyahu has threatened to end the settlement moratorium.

Despite Abbas’ presence at the negotiating table, strong objections to the direct talks persist in Palestinian society and may derail the peace process. On August 31st, Hamas killed four Jewish settlers on the eve of the Washington talks. Thirteen armed Palestinian organizations also threatened to hit Tel Aviv with rockets during the first week of September.

President Abbas’ authority and legitimacy are on the brink of collapse. This will limit his ability to implement an agreement. Many Palestinians view Abbas' willingness to negotiate with the Israeli government as a sign of weakness, if not treason.

U.S. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also appear to have lost their enthusiasm since the beginning of September. In mid-September, at his press conference in the White House, Obama said that the parties would be responsible for a failure. It looks like he is trying to prepare his public for a potential failure.

Supporters of direct talks should understand that Abbas is not former Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leader, Yasser Arafat. Both politically and geographically, Gaza is out of his reach. Rather than talking with his Israeli counterparts, Abbas should spend more time talking with the people in Gaza.

Last week, Netanyahu’s threats on the settlement issue turned into a reality. Religious Jews restarted settlement building in the West Bank. Most members of the Israeli government applauded this development. So, we can say goodbye to the direct talks!

So who will help bridge the internal divide in Israel and put a stop to illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank? Obama and Clinton can increase the political pressure on Israel by holding back aid. The international community and media can work more efficiently to lift the blockade of Gaza. These steps would be more helpful than giving lip service to the Palestinians.

So far, Israel has tried to tame Gaza by using various measures, from heavy bombing to man hunting, from mass arrests to blockade. To what end? Further radicalization of Gazans and an increased opposition to Israel? Now, it is time to try the untested: fully lift the Gaza blockade.

People may say that peace is impossible without the pressure of the talks. Sure, the negotiations are needed – but only at the right time. Even if Abbas and Netanyahu were to sign an agreement, who would implement it in Gaza? Nobody, because Abbas has no political control there.

Supporters of Israel maintain that Hamas wants to destroy Israel and so, there is no way to talk with them. They should read Jeroen Gunning’s book Hamas in Politics to discover the pragmatism of Hamas and its internal dynamics. Remember, before the Oslo Accords the Palestine Liberation Organization was the biggest terrorist organization for Israel. Today, its members eat with Israelis at the same table.

Finally, supporters of talks now argue that there will never be a trouble-free time to talk, that we must seize the moment. But past successes have always had greater public support. When then PLO leader, Yasser Arafat was talking with then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, the vast majority of Palestinians were cheering him despite economic and political problems in Palestine. Today, these people are cursing Abbas for his efforts.

Some experts say that Abbas is successful in providing economic stability in the West Bank. I agree. But his success is widening the gap between Gaza and the West Bank. This gap would be an obstacle for a possible peace.

Do not misunderstand: peace without peace talks is impossible. But the time must be right for talks to produce a durable peace. Both Abbas’ and Netanyahu started to blow up the hand-grenades under the table. The explosion will not injure only these two politicians. The whole region is in danger.

Generals without epaulets

Since when can the further consolidation of prime ministerial power be called an advance for democracy?

By Kıvanç Özcan

Haaretz 15.10.2010

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was extremely happy on the night of September 12 in the wake of his AKP party’s victory in the constitutional referendum. Fifty-eight percent of the country’s voters gave their approval to the first major reforms in the country’s constitution since a 1980 military coup.

Some Turkish commentators characterized the results as a slap in the face to Turkish fascists, while in some foreign media Erdogan was described as an “Eastern star” and a “hero.” In the prime minister’s view, the referendum results amounted to an affirmation of democracy.

But “one minute!” − to recall Mr. Erdogan’s interjection from Davos, in January 2009, when a moderator tried to cut him off while he responded angrily to Israeli President Shimon Peres.

Since when can the further consolidation of prime ministerial power be called an advance for democracy? In fact September 12 will be remembered as yet one more slap in the face for Turkish democracy − no less devastating than the 1980 coup, though without the violence.
It’s true that the referendum had nothing to do with Israel, but as our regional neighbors, Israelis should be concerned about the ways in which it weakens Turkish democracy.

To begin with, the very process was itself anti-democratic. Citizens could only give a simple, single “yes” or “no” to a list of 26 different articles, most of which were unrelated to each other and were not arranged by theme on the ballot. Surveys revealed that most voters did not know most of the points they were voting on.

Unfortunately, it was the leaders’ personalities in both camps that influenced many people in their voting.

For his part, Erdogan did not hesitate to harshly warn people against a “no” vote, which he implied would be tantamount to supporting future coups d’etat. In effect, he left the public little option but to vote “yes.” As a result of the vote, the executive has increased its control over the judiciary.

Until now, the constitutional court has served as the last effective check on the government, by hearing challenges to the constitutionality of laws. Additionally, the court also hears cases against the president and prime minister. The referendum increases the number of judges in the court from 11 to 17, and gives the president a larger role in their selection. Little surprise, then, that shortly after the vote, Erdogan ‏(who is suspected of having his eye on the presidency‏) and his followers initiated a discussion on the presidential system.

Another supposed democratic measure of the referendum package was a clause that makes it legal for civil servants to enter into collective bargaining agreements. Since they are still denied the right to strike, however, the measure is an empty one. That right is to be discussed later.

The main claim of the government in pushing for a “yes” vote was that the constitutional changes weaken the power of the military in favor of the legislative branch. And in fairness, that’s true. It limits the role of the military judiciary in civilian matters, something that even most opponents of the referendum package agreed with. However, this should not overshadow the fact that Erdogan and his party at the same time have weakened the checks on the legislative and executive branches as well.

Erdogan’s ruling party and its supporters maintain that the vote of September 12, 2010, serves to settle an old account with leaders of the September 12, 1980, military coup. That’s very welcome. But if that’s the case, one might have thought that the reforms would include the abolition of the Council of Higher Education. The council, the central ruling body of Turkish universities, may have been the most significant and tangible “gift” of the coup. Its power, which includes the appointment of university rectors, hangs over our institutions of higher learning like a sword of Damocles. But the council is still with us.

Turkish democracy is hardly a lost cause. But if the Erdogan government is serious, as it says it is, about strengthening democracy, it could start by ending the illegal police wiretaps that are used for surveillance of the government’s political enemies.

Erdogan could also apologize to the Turkish people for unethically pressing them to vote “yes” on the referendum. And as the referendum is a temporary measure, and is supposed to be followed by the drafting of a new constitution, he could include the opposition, such as Kurdish deputies in the parliament, in that process.

Some outsiders have asked whether the referendum strengthens the role of Islam in the state. It doesn’t. But a creeping theocracy is not the only concern of Turkish democrats. The changes dictated by the September 12 referendum increase the powers of the executive and legislative branches over the judiciary, and that weakens the separation of powers.

Democratic maturity necessitates respect for the referendum results. But democratic maturity and responsible citizenship require speaking up as well. The results of the vote may be a victory for Erdogan, but they give the Turkish republic no cause for celebration. The crowds applauding Erdogan and his government were actually cheering a new set of generals − without the epaulets.

tuvalin öyküsü

şöminenin önüne boylu boyunca uzanmış
şarabi bir halet-i ruhiye kuşanmış

sonra kırmızı bir suskunluk hasıl oldu:
sana uzaklardan masallar getirdim dedim
geniş kırlar, mutlu papatyalar
ve gülümseyen göller...
avuçlarıma tırmanabilir misin?
diye sordum.

uzak bir ülkenin
sadece onun bildiği bir ırmağında
zamanı yüzdürüp gelmiş

gözleri doldu:
kadife yorgunluklarım var dedi
sararmış fotoğraflar, kurumuş karanfiller
ve parke taşlarında danseden iskarpinler
ışıkları kapatabilir misin?
diye sordu.

bu evdeki bütün renkler ölmüş
duvarlarda sadece sepya bir tuval
unutulmuş

yağmur yağıyordu
gökyüzünde güneş var dedim ona
beyaz bir tirandil geçti camdan
sonra çocuklar, müzikler
ve ayrılıklar
paltonu çıkartabilir misin?
diye sordum

yüzünde çizgiler varmış
güzelliğini maziye dökmüş

zamanı içtim ağır ağır
avuçlarıma tırmandı
demir damlalara dönüştük

şöminede sepya bir tuval
yanmış
saatler durmuş.


Kıvanç

30 Eylül, Washington, DC

kara

utandiran bir tadi olmali
tedirginlikten usengeclige gecisin
bosverislerden daha derin
kendine seyirci kalisin

ruzgarin onundeki
yaprak bile degilsin artik
hersey gecti
butun trenler gitti
tukendi zaman
acik kaldi yaran

beklemistim oysa
ne cok ne cok...
yarali bir hayvan oldum
yakalari kavusmayan sehir oldum
sonunda ruzgar oldum
gectim senden,

uzak bir kuzey gecesiyim simdi
alnimda mavi buz saraylari
ardimda yalazli bir yara
senin gibi
kizil ve kara...


Kivanc
26 Eylul, Washington DC

Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East Revisited

by Kivanc Ozcan


This short article aims to develop a critical perspective on Mona Ghali’s article: Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East. As it is stated in Ghali’s study, the presence of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the region dates back to 1982 when non-UN peacekeeping forces deployed in Sinai and Beirut.

To begin with, raising criticisms of the MFO in Sinai is possible with the critical reading of the Camp David Accords and the March 1979 Peace Treaty. Whereas Anwar Sadat inferred that the Accords resolved the return of the all lands confiscated after 1967, returning the Sinai to Egypt was sufficient for Menachem Begin. Apart from the ambiguous nature of the Accords, the last article of the 1979 treaty, which is based on the freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran, prioritizes Israeli economic and security interests.

Following the expiration of its mandate, UNEF II withdrew from the Sinai in 1979. Without mentioning why, Ghali argues that the UN forces were unproductive. The author also implies that an anticipated Soviet Union veto for the deployment of the UN force in Sinai was the main motive behind the creation of MFO. However, the reason behind potential Soviet Union veto remains intact.

The formation and structure of the MFO is another matter of debate. Mostly Anglo-Saxon countries and the U.S. dominated countries supported this initiative. The U.S appoints the Director General of the MFO. In addition to these, the military and economic contributions of the U.S. are far more than the other supporters. Also, the Observer Unit of MFO evolved from the U.S. Sinai Field Mission all members of which were U.S. citizens. So, provocative ideas such as that Egypt had become neo-imperialisms latest victim and that the MFO treaty is the subordination of Egyptian interests to US security interests should be reviewed.

Furthermore, the Protocol of August 1981 assured that the withdrawal of the MFO would require both parties’ approval. That is to say the withdrawal of an international force from Egyptian territory is impossible without the consent of another country. How would it be related to the concept of territorial sovereignty?

Without any doubt, President Sadat consciously changed the nature of the political climate between Egypt and its former Arab allies, and the image of his country, by becoming a U.S. ally. But how has the presence of the MFO in the Middle East changed the image of U.S. in the region? The Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut may provide an answer for this question.

The first MNF successfully fulfilled its responsibility by evacuating Palestinian and Syrian fighters from Lebanon in 1982. However, the problems arose with the deployment of the MNF II. As its duties were not clearly set and its avoidance of the sui generis conditions of Lebanese society, the MNF II became one of the fighting sides in the country.

However, it was predictable that American and French-dominated structure of the MNF II might escalate the tensions in this ethnically diverse and politically polarized country, and jeopardize the impartiality of the force. The author rightly quotes from Kamal Salibi that the tension between Arabism and Lebanism was the main pillar of the conflict in Lebanon. Therefore, the deployment of French forces, which has historical connections with Lebanon’s Christians, paved the way of the radicalization of various Muslim fractions in the country.

Furthermore, the training of the Christian dominated Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by the MNF II alarmed Sunni and Shia militias as they opposed to the idea of PaxAmericana and unfair power sharing in Lebanon. So, unanticipated results such as the rise of Iranian influence on Lebanese politics came into play and hastened the withdrawal of MNF II from Lebanon. In her conclusion, Ghali argues that MNF II was not successful since they deployed into a politically polarized environment. However, this superficial conclusion does not answer the question of whether the U.S. and France consciously used the MNF II as a tool to transform Lebanese politics in favor of their interests.

To sum up, as it is seen in Sinai case, consent of the fighting parties is a prerequisite for the success of MFO or MNF. Those cases demonstrate that different dynamics are in play for inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Lebanon case clearly demonstrates that the ‘hidden’ identity of MNF may have led to escalation and deepening of a conflict.

artik yordunuz...

Artik yordunuz... Referandum icin dagittiginiz rusvetler, cevirdiginiz dolaplar, oyuna bile sahip olamayan muhalefet lideri ve irkciligin dislerini gostermeye her zaman hazir olanlar. Yarattiginiz bu karmasa ve kargasanin icinde dusunemez olmusum. Her birimizin onceden belirlenen bir tarafi ve buna gore oynamamiz gereken roller vardi. Hayir diyen darbeci Evet diyen aptaldi. Ve biz bu topraklarda beraber yasamak zorunda oldugumuzu gormemek icin cabaladik. Kibarlik yapip cabaladik diyorum ama kendi adima konusacak olursam ben ne darbeciyim ne de referandumda evet dedim. Sizler tepisirken ben kullanacagim oyu anlamlandirmak icin bu ulkenin en saygin bilim insanlarinin yazilarini okuyordum. Sandikta benimle ayni dogrultuda oy kullanan insanlarin bir bolumuyle adimin ayni cumlede gecmesi bile benim icin utanclarin en buyugudur. Fakat sunu da belirtmek isterim, artik yalniz ve guzel ulkemde siyaset yapma alani tek bir gucun elinde toplaniyor ve haliyle daraliyor. Benim tamamen karsisinda oldugum sagci ve muhafazakar bir zihniyetin kafesine giriyoruz. Kiz arkadasiyla elele tutustugu icin parktaki genci dovduren adamlar simdi yargiyi ele gecirdiler. Alevilere zorla Sunnilik ogretmek isteyenler simdi biraz daha guclendiler. Iscileri Taksim'de ve Kizilay'da coplayanlar simdi baskanlik sisteminden soz ediyorlar. Kurtlerin temsilcilerini muhattap almadan acilim yapmaya kalkisanlar hepimizin telefonlarini dinliyorlar. Bu memleketin irkcisindan, ulusalcisindan yeterince tiksindim, tiksiniyorum. Bu nefretimi muhafazakar iktidarindan mi esirgeyecegim?

Artik yordunuz... Kurtlerin, Alevilerin, iscilerin ve yoksullarin haklari icin cabaladiklarini soyleyenler cemaatin iktidariyla cilvelesiyorlar simdi. Gucun karsisinda hizaya geciyorlar. Onumuzdeki yillarda yasayacagim ulkeyi belirlemek icin ugrastigim su zamanlarda benim icin once buyuk bir uzuntu sonra da motivasyon kaynagi oldu bu geride biraktigimiz 10 gun. Kusura bakmayin, bireysel iliskilerinizden, kurumsal iliskilerinize kadar kocaman bir guvensizlik, ruhsuzluk, tasralilik ve paranoyaklik uzerine kurdugunuz bu cumhuriyet benim cumhuriyetim degil. Dini sorunlarinizi yasaklarla, etnik sorunlarinizi silahlarla, siyasi sorunlarinizi hamasetle cozmeye devam edebilirsiniz. Universitelerde turban serbest olsun dedigimde AKP'li, Kurt sorununu silahla cozemeyiz dedigimde PKK'li, referandumda Hayir dedigimde askerci dediginiz BENDENIZ savundugu siyasi dusunce ne olursa olsun cigeri bes para etmeyen ve suratlarina tukurmek istedigim adamlarla ugrasmaktan artik gercekten yoruldum.

Artik yordunuz... Bugun belki de bundan sonra, Turkiye'ye sadece turistik ziyaret icin gelmemi gerektirecek olan is basvurumu yaparken boyle duygular icindeydim. Kabul edilirim veya edilmem orasini bilemiyorum. Ama bildigim bir sey var, ben artik bu sosyal demokrat musveddeleriyle, islamcilarla, irkcilarla ve darbecilerle ayni oksijeni solumamak icin canimi disime takmis bulunuyorum!

ne kadar milliyetçi o kadar kapitalist/ muktedir sorgulanmaz “vatan hainisiniz”/ lakin her dilde faşizm “beton millet sakarya”