Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East Revisited

by Kivanc Ozcan


This short article aims to develop a critical perspective on Mona Ghali’s article: Non-UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East. As it is stated in Ghali’s study, the presence of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the region dates back to 1982 when non-UN peacekeeping forces deployed in Sinai and Beirut.

To begin with, raising criticisms of the MFO in Sinai is possible with the critical reading of the Camp David Accords and the March 1979 Peace Treaty. Whereas Anwar Sadat inferred that the Accords resolved the return of the all lands confiscated after 1967, returning the Sinai to Egypt was sufficient for Menachem Begin. Apart from the ambiguous nature of the Accords, the last article of the 1979 treaty, which is based on the freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran, prioritizes Israeli economic and security interests.

Following the expiration of its mandate, UNEF II withdrew from the Sinai in 1979. Without mentioning why, Ghali argues that the UN forces were unproductive. The author also implies that an anticipated Soviet Union veto for the deployment of the UN force in Sinai was the main motive behind the creation of MFO. However, the reason behind potential Soviet Union veto remains intact.

The formation and structure of the MFO is another matter of debate. Mostly Anglo-Saxon countries and the U.S. dominated countries supported this initiative. The U.S appoints the Director General of the MFO. In addition to these, the military and economic contributions of the U.S. are far more than the other supporters. Also, the Observer Unit of MFO evolved from the U.S. Sinai Field Mission all members of which were U.S. citizens. So, provocative ideas such as that Egypt had become neo-imperialisms latest victim and that the MFO treaty is the subordination of Egyptian interests to US security interests should be reviewed.

Furthermore, the Protocol of August 1981 assured that the withdrawal of the MFO would require both parties’ approval. That is to say the withdrawal of an international force from Egyptian territory is impossible without the consent of another country. How would it be related to the concept of territorial sovereignty?

Without any doubt, President Sadat consciously changed the nature of the political climate between Egypt and its former Arab allies, and the image of his country, by becoming a U.S. ally. But how has the presence of the MFO in the Middle East changed the image of U.S. in the region? The Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut may provide an answer for this question.

The first MNF successfully fulfilled its responsibility by evacuating Palestinian and Syrian fighters from Lebanon in 1982. However, the problems arose with the deployment of the MNF II. As its duties were not clearly set and its avoidance of the sui generis conditions of Lebanese society, the MNF II became one of the fighting sides in the country.

However, it was predictable that American and French-dominated structure of the MNF II might escalate the tensions in this ethnically diverse and politically polarized country, and jeopardize the impartiality of the force. The author rightly quotes from Kamal Salibi that the tension between Arabism and Lebanism was the main pillar of the conflict in Lebanon. Therefore, the deployment of French forces, which has historical connections with Lebanon’s Christians, paved the way of the radicalization of various Muslim fractions in the country.

Furthermore, the training of the Christian dominated Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by the MNF II alarmed Sunni and Shia militias as they opposed to the idea of PaxAmericana and unfair power sharing in Lebanon. So, unanticipated results such as the rise of Iranian influence on Lebanese politics came into play and hastened the withdrawal of MNF II from Lebanon. In her conclusion, Ghali argues that MNF II was not successful since they deployed into a politically polarized environment. However, this superficial conclusion does not answer the question of whether the U.S. and France consciously used the MNF II as a tool to transform Lebanese politics in favor of their interests.

To sum up, as it is seen in Sinai case, consent of the fighting parties is a prerequisite for the success of MFO or MNF. Those cases demonstrate that different dynamics are in play for inter-state and intra-state conflicts. Lebanon case clearly demonstrates that the ‘hidden’ identity of MNF may have led to escalation and deepening of a conflict.